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What Makes Parties Joint Employers? An
Analysis of the National Labor Relations
Board’s Redefining of the “Joint Employer”
Standard and Its Potential Effect on the
Labor Industry
Deepti Orekondy*
Multiple cases decided before the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) have continuously narrowed the scope of the joint
employer doctrine. Most recently, in the case of Browning-Ferris
Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (August 27, 2015), the NLRB
overturned decades of precedent and adopted a much more
expansive standard that reverts the doctrine back to its original
understanding in 1965. Prior to this decision, the joint employer
doctrine established a joint employer relationship when both
entities had meaningful control over the terms and conditions of
employment and actually exercised that authority. After
Browning-Ferris, the new standard now only requires “indirect”
control, regardless of actualization of that authority, over workers
for businesses to be considered employers and be responsible for
labor disputes and negotiations.
The new standard has far reaching implications for the labor
industry and affects the bargaining power and rights of entities all
the way down the chain. The changes lead to increased liability
for employees, greater bargaining power for unions and
employees, and a threat to the franchise business model.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The joint employer doctrine is a federal doctrine that determines
whether two entities are both simultaneously considered employers over
an employee.1 When a joint employer relationship exists, “both entities
must comply with the applicable laws with respect to the employees at
issue and are liable as employers . . . .”2 After three long decades of
precedent establishing a standard for finding a joint employer relationship,
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has decided the

29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2016).
Dianne LaRocca, NLRB Joint Employer Redefinition Threatens Franchises, LAW360
(Jan. 21, 2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/613307/nlrb-joint-employerredefinition-threatens-franchises.
1
2
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transformation of the doctrine over the years is baseless, and no longer
conforms to the changes in our economy.3
In August of 2015, the NLRB made a startling decision regarding the
joint employer doctrine in the case of Browning-Ferris Indus.4 The result
of this decision redefined the doctrine, leaving the labor industry in frenzy
with employers worried about increased liability, franchisees concerned
about a loss of independence, and labor unions high with greater
bargaining power.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the basic concepts necessary to
understand the role and impact of the joint employer doctrine on the labor
industry. Part II will review the evolution of the joint employer doctrine
from 1965 until the present. Part III evaluates possible implications for the
labor industry such as the increased responsibility of employers, unions
having greater bargaining power, and the new liability placed upon
franchisors.

A.
The National Labor Relations Act: What Does It Mean To
Be An Employer?
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was established by
Congress in 1935 with the intent to “protect the rights of employees and
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain
private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the
general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”5 Under the
NLRA an employer is defined as “any person acting as an agent of an
employer,” whether directly or indirectly.6 An employee is defined in
essence as “any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer, unless [the NLRA] explicitly states otherwise,”
which includes “any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment,” but does not include any individual
that is an independent contractor.7 Even though the joint employer doctrine
is not codified, it is an extension of the NLRA. The status of joint employer
is dependent upon whether the putative joint employer has a common law

NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (last updated Aug. 28, 2015,
7:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826; see also
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
4
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
5
National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, https://www.nlrb.
gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
6
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).
7
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
3
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employment relationship with the employees at issue.8 Central to this
determination is “the existence, extent, and object of the putative joint
employer’s control.”9

B.
What Is A Union And What Is Its Role In Collective
Bargaining?
A union is an organization of employees of a particular workplace that
choose to join together to work toward achieving common employment
goals.10 The purpose of forming and joining a union is for employees to
collectively try and improve their working conditions, such as wages,
hours, and job safety.11 Essentially, unions unite workers and use their
strength in numbers to create a voice for the employees and in turn are the
vehicles used to negotiate with employers.12 Unions are valuable tools for
employees in all work environments because it allows them to secure
equality in all work environments and protects them from overreaching
employers.13
To understand the benefit of the joint employer doctrine to unions, one
must understand the concept of collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining is a process which workers, through their union
representatives, can negotiate the terms of their employment contracts.14
Before collective bargaining can occur though, the employees must
unionize. Once employees unionize and elections are held to select a union
representative, the representative negotiates with the employer on behalf
of the employees.15 The representative works with employers to create a
contract, which the employees can vote to accept or reject.16 The resulting
contract is known as the collective bargaining agreement.17 This
agreement is a binding contract.18 However, it is important to note that

Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. at 2.
Id.
10
Learn About Unions, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions (last
visited Jan. 17, 2017).
11
Id.
12
What Unions Do, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/WhatUnions-Do (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
13
See id.
14
Collective Bargaining Fact Sheet, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-AboutUnions/Collective-Bargaining/Collective-Bargaining-Fact-Sheet (last visited Jan. 17,
2017).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 308 (2016).
18
Id.
8
9
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these agreements do not supersede or nullify any of the rights normally
afforded to workers by law.19
The employer, employees, and unions are all intertwined when it
comes to the employer – employee relationship. As a result, all parties are
affected when there is a change in the joint employer doctrine. Those who
are now deemed to be a joint employer under the new standard may be
subject to liability and responsibility that they had not originally
anticipated when entering into their respective agreements and unions may
have additional entities with which it can negotiate.

II.

EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER STANDARD

A.

The “Share or Co-Determine” Standard

The essence of the joint employer doctrine can be traced back to
Greyhound Corp. in 1965.20 Greyhound Corp. was focused on a union
representation issue of a refusal-to-bargain allegation that required a
determination of whether two employers, Greyhound Corporation
(“Greyhound”) and Floors, Inc. (“Floors”), were joint employers.21 On
remand from the Supreme Court, the NLRB had determined that
Greyhound and Floors were joint employers for purposes of determining
collective bargaining units and when the two employers were called upon
to engage in collective bargaining they refused.22 The employers believed
that the NLRB was incorrect in determining that they were joint employers
and as such the designated bargaining unit was not appropriate.23
Greyhound and Floors contended that Floors was an independent
contractor and therefore the sole employer over those workers it placed at
the Greyhound terminals.24 Floors alleged that the bargaining unit should
consist solely of Floors employees collectively across all the Greyhound
terminals or each terminal should consist of separate, individual
bargaining units.25
Upon reviewing the service agreements between Greyhound and
Floors, the NLRB found two statutory employers to be joint employers of
certain workers because they “share[d], or codetermine[d], those matters
governing essential terms and conditions of employment.”26 This decision
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
See Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1490 (1965).
Id. at 1490–91.
Id. at 1496.
Id. at 1490.
Id.
Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. at 1490.
Id. at 1495.
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was premised on the common control between the two regarding terms
and conditions not limited to but including working hours, scheduling,
number of workers needed, manner in which work is completed, and
wages.27 The NLRB noted that the substantial influence both employers
had over the workers qualified them as joint employers regardless of
whether Floors was an independent contractor.28 Therefore, because they
were joint employers, the refusal to bargain was an unfair labor practice.29
Although this standard was established, it was not consistently applied
until the Third Circuit endorsed it in 1982 in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris
Indus. of PA.30 In Browning-Ferris,31 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
was required to determine whether Browning-Ferris Industries of
Pennsylvania, Inc. (“BFI”) was a joint employer under the NLRA in order
to determine if it was responsible for unfair labor practices.32 The court
examined two different standards for determining employer status: the
joint employer standard set out in Greyhound Corp. and the single
employer standard the NLRB had used in Radio Union v. Broadcast
Service of Mobile, Inc.33 BFI maintained that the four factor test for a
finding of a single employer set forth in Radio Union was the correct
standard to be applied.34 This test determined whether “two nominally
separate entities are actually part of a single integrated enterprise so that,
for all purposes, there is in fact only a ‘single employer.’”35 The four
factors for a finding of a single employer include the following: “(1)
functional integration of operations; (2) centralized control of labor
relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership.”36
In reviewing Radio Union and the additional cases BFI cited, the court
in Browning-Ferris (1982) determined that the joint employer concept
does not require a finding of a single integrated enterprise, and that finding
a joint employer relationship assumes that both entities are independent
but jointly maintain control over important aspects of the employment
Id. at 1495–96.
Id. at 1494–95.
29
Id. at 1496.
30
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 12 (Aug. 27, 2015); see also
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of PA, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982),
enforcing 259 N.L.R.B. 148 (1981).
31
It should be noted that this Browning-Ferris case was from 1982 and was one of the
original cases that established the previous standard for the joint employer doctrine. This
case is separate from the Browning-Ferris case decided by the NLRB in 2015.
32
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of PA, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982),
enforcing 259 N.L.R.B. 148 (1981); see also Radio Union v. Broad. Serv of Mobile, Inc.,
380 U.S. 255 (1965).
33
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1121; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255.
34
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1121-22; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255.
35
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1121-22; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255.
36
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1122; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255.
27
28
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relationship.37 As such, the court maintained that the single employer
standard is inappropriate and that the Greyhound Corp. “share or codetermine” standard is best applicable.38 The court determined the fact that
BFI shared with its “brokers” the responsibility of hiring, firing,
establishing work hours, and compensation was substantial evidence to
support a finding of shared significant control to determine that the parties
were in fact joint employers.39
The 1982 Browning-Ferris case served to clarify and untangle the
joint employer doctrine by explaining that even though this type of direct
authority and control was present, the NLRB did not require that this right
be exercised, or that it be exercised in any particular manner.40 It
established that it was sufficient for a finding of joint employer status to
exist even if the employer merely had the ability to have direct control
over the employees, whether or not it was exercised.41 After the Third
Circuit’s endorsement, the standard was further bolstered when the NLRB
adopted it in two subsequent 1984 cases.42

B.
Narrowing the Doctrine: Shift from Reserved Control to
Actual Exercise of Authority
The joint employer doctrine was again revamped when additional
requirements were added that narrowed the joint-employer standard.43 The
shift away from the reliance on “reserved control and indirect control as
indicia of joint employer status” was evidenced by the Laerco Transp.
decision with its emphasis and focus on the actual exercise of control.44 In
this case, the NLRB was required to determine whether Laerco
Transportation and Warehouse (“Laerco”) and California Transportation
Labor, Inc. (“CTL”) were joint employers in regards to establishing an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining.45 Laerco contested that the
finding of joint employer status was not supported by the record and was
a departure from NLRB precedent.46 The NLRB maintained the
importance of the concept of separate entities sharing or codetermining
matters essential to employment, but also established that “there must be
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1122.
Id. at 1122-24.
39
Id. at 1124-25.
40
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 13 (Aug. 27, 2015).
41
Id. at 11.
42
NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION, http://www.wsj.com/articles/n
lrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826 (last updated Aug. 28, 2015, 7:49 PM); see Laerco
Transp., 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984); TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1985).
43
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 13.
44
Id.
45
Laerco, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984).
46
Id.
37
38

122

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:115

a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the
employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and
direction.”47 Applying these requirements to the facts of the case, the
NLRB found that Laerco’s control over CTL employees was “minimal and
routine in nature” and was not enough to effectively control the
employment of CTL employees.48 The major elements of employment and
the acquisition and retention of the employees was controlled by CTL.49
Therefore, because Laerco did not actively and meaningfully affect the
employment of CTL employees, the NLRB found that they were not joint
employers.50
This requirement of exercising control was actualized in TLI, Inc.
where the NLRB reinforced the doctrine by restating the “meaningful
control” standard from Laerco Transp. for a joint employer relationship to
exist.51 In TLI, Inc., the NLRB agreed with the joint employer standard set
forth in a prior hearing by the Administrative Law Judge, but concluded
that TLI and Crown Zellerback (“Crown”) were not joint employers.52 TLI
served as the lessor of Crown’s transportation carrier drivers and the judge
determined that because Crown shared some control that it was a joint
employer.53 Crown contended that it was not a joint employer and that the
correct standard to be applied was the four-factor test for the single
employer standard.54 The NLRB upon review of this decision agreed with
the judge that the single employer standard was not applicable because that
test is only used to determine if two separate entities establish a single
enterprise.55 The NLRB agreed with the judge that the correct standard to
be utilized was that which was recognized by the Third Circuit, that
“where two separate entities share or codetermine those matters governing
the essential terms and conditions of employment, they are to be
considered joint employers for purposes of the [NLRA].”56 Although the
NLRB agreed on the standard to be applied, it did not agree with the court
that Crown was a joint employer with TLI.57 The NLRB held that even
though Crown did exercise some control over the drivers, the control did
not reach the degree of meaningful effect upon the terms and conditions,

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 325.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 325.
Laerco, 269 N.L.R.B. 325 (1984).
TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1985).
Id. at 798–99.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1985).
Id. at 799.
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and because it lacked authority to hire, fire or discipline as is needed,
Crown could not be deemed a joint employer.58
These two cases in conjunction embody the transformations of the
joint employer doctrine that the NLRB has now reviewed and reconsidered
under its new decision in Browning-Ferris Indus. in 2015.

C.

Refining of the Joint Employer Doctrine

Until the recent decision by the NLRB, a joint employer relationship
could be established so long as there was the ability for direct exercise of
meaningful control and that such control was actually exercised. In August
of 2015, in the case of Browning-Ferris Indus., the NLRB determined that
with the changes in the economy and the labor industry, a revision of the
joint employer standard was necessary. Upon reviewing the precedent, the
NLRB found that
[i]f the current joint-employer standard is narrower than
statutorily necessary, and if joint-employment
arrangements are increasing, the risk is increased that the
Board is failing in what the Supreme Court has described
as the Board’s ‘responsibility to adapt the Act to the
changing patterns of industrial life.’59
The NLRB then determined that it would be wise to go back to the roots
of the joint employer doctrine and revisit the 1965 standard.

1. Browning-Ferris Indus. (2015)
At issue in the recent Browning-Ferris (2015) case is whether BFI and
Leadpoint were considered joint employers. In the process of making such
a determination, the NLRB considered the standard for assessing joint
employer status under the NLRA. This case arose as a result of a
representation petition filed on behalf of workers led by the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, a union, which sought to represent workers
employed by a subcontractor, Leadpoint.60 The petition asserted that
Browning-Ferris was a joint employer with Leadpoint because it had
contracted with Leadpoint for temporary labor.61

Id.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 15 (Aug. 27, 2015).
60
Richard L. Alfred et al., How Will Browning-Ferris Change the Test for JointEmployer Status for Union and Non-Union Employers?, SEYFARTH SHAW: PUBLICATIONS/
BLOG POSTS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA082715-LE.
61
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 9.
58
59
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Facts

In Browning-Ferris (2015), BFI owned and operated a recycling
facility within which it employed approximately sixty (60) employees,
which were part of an existing separate bargaining unit.62 BFI contracted
with Leadpoint, a supplier firm, to provide workers to work at the BFI
facility.63 BFI and Leadpoint had a temporary labor services agreement
that stated Leadpoint was the sole employer of the employees it provides,
and that no part of the agreement should be construed to create an
employment relationship between BFI and the personnel provided by
Leadpoint.64 BFI and Leadpoint both had its own supervisors and work
leaders at the facility to oversee employees.65 BFI had no control over the
hiring process of Leadpoint employees, but Leadpoint was to ensure that
all hired personnel had the necessary qualifications with the caveat that
BFI had the authority to request a certain standard for selection be met or
exceeded during Leadpoint’s hiring process.66
In terms of disciplining employees, Leadpoint maintained sole
responsibility to counsel, discipline, evaluate, and terminate employees
that were assigned to BFI.67 However, BFI retained the right to reject “and
discontinue use of any Leadpoint personnel for any or no reason.”68 As for
wages, BFI was to follow a rate schedule where it compensated Leadpoint
for each worker, but Leadpoint was responsible for the pay rate and
issuance of paychecks to its personnel.69 Further, Leadpoint employees
were required to sign a waiver stating that they were only eligible for
benefits through Leadpoint and were not eligible for any benefits through
BFI.70
The workflow and process was primarily determined by BFI.71 BFI
was responsible for determining what would be done each day and where
employees would be stationed. 72 To implement BFI’s plan, BFI provided
Leadpoint with a target number of employees needed for that day and
Leadpoint was in charge of assigning specific employees to specific
stations.73 If changes needed to be made to the stationing of employees,
BFI could direct the Leadpoint supervisors to move employees as
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 6–7.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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needed.74 Both Leadpoint and BFI provided training to Leadpoint
personnel.75 As for safety, Leadpoint’s employees were required to follow
BFI safety procedures and BFI had the right to enforce its safety policy
upon Leadpoint employees.76

b)

New Joint Employer Standard

Upon review of the pertinent facts and numerous viewpoints regarding
the appropriate standard for finding a joint employer relationship, the
NLRB has decided to upend thirty years of precedent and to embrace the
1965 standard endorsed by the Third Circuit finding that “[t]he Board may
find that two or more entities are joint employers of a single work force if
they are both employers within the meaning of the common law, and if
they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and
conditions of employment.”77 In addition, the decision held that the NLRB
only requires an employer possess indirect control, and removes the need
for exercise of that control.78 With this refining and regression of the
doctrine, the NLRB ultimately overruled Laerco Transp. and TLI, Inc.79
Now, the NLRB has the standard to be more expansive and as a result,
more ambiguous.

III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW JOINT EMPLOYER
STANDARD

Redefining the joint employer standard has transformed the scope of
the doctrine to encompass a broader range within which to find a joint
employer relationship. As a result, the labor industry has become
concerned with the potential implications this may have on employers,
employees, franchises, and labor unions because now there is greater
likelihood that a joint employer relationship will be found.80
To restate, after the 2015 Browning-Ferris decision the NLRB
determined that

Id.
Id. at 8.
76
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 8.
77
Id. at 19; see also Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1495 (1965); N.L.R.B. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of PA, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982), enforcing 259
N.L.R.B. 148 (1981).
78
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 2.
79
Id.
80
NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (last updated Aug. 28, 2015,
7:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826.
74
75
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joint-employer status may be found where both entities
(1) are employers within the meaning of the common law,
and (2) “share or codetermine those matters governing the
essential terms and conditions of employment.” This
means that joint-employer status will be found where the
putative joint-employer actually exercises direct or
indirect control over essential terms and conditions of
employment of another entity’s employees, or has simply
reserved the right to exercise such control.81
When a joint employer relationship is found, both entities are
responsible for “an action due either to their actual pursuit of a common
course in violation of the NLRA or merely by virtue of their shared control
over labor relation matters.”82 With this change in the standard, the NLRB
has shifted the test from finding an actual existing joint relationship to
deeming employers as joint employers based on what their relationship
may be expanded to encompass.83 This means that even the mere ability
to control is sufficient for a finding of a joint employment relationship,
whether or not it’s ever actually exercised. The Board’s decision will
impact every sector of the labor industry that has structured their business
based on the settled 30-year precedent of employment law with the belief
that “absent the direct control necessary for a true employer-employee
relationship, the entity will not be a joint employer under the NLRA.”84
With the expanded scope within which a joint employer relationship
can be found, there is an increased likelihood that more employers will be
liable for unfair labor practices, unions will have greater bargaining power,
and the essence of the franchise business model may begin to crumble.

A.

Impact on Employers

Now that there is a greater possibility of finding a joint employer
relationship, employers are put in the hot seat. The status of joint employer
is not simply a title but carries with it the possibility of increased liability
and responsibility. Joint employer status will impact the individual
employers on a daily basis because “[t]he joint employer doctrine is
applied mostly in unfair labor practice proceedings when two business
Zachary D. Fasman et al., What Organizations Need to Know Regarding the NLRB’s
Revised Joint-Employer Standard, 22 HR Advisor: Legal & Practical Guidance No. 1
(2016).
82
9 EMP. COORD. LABOR RELATIONS, WESTLAW § 4:27 (Supp. January 2017).
83
Richard L. Alfred et al., How Will Browning-Ferris Change the Test for JointEmployer Status for Union and Non-Union Employers?, SEYFARTH SHAW: PUBLICATIONS/
BLOG POSTS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA082715-LE.
84
Id.
81
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entities are charged with dual responsibility for an action due either to their
actual pursuit of a common course in violation of the NLRA or merely by
virtue of their shared control over labor relations matters.”85
Essentially, once two entities are deemed joint employers, they are
both considered the primary employer.86 As such, employers are now
potentially responsible for all of the actions of its contractors and affiliates
in regard to their employees.87 For example, “if a manager of the supplier
employer unlawfully threatened a contract worker concerning activities
protected under the NLRA (such as signing a union card), both employers
would be liable for that violation.”88 Even though the user employer had
no part in making the threat, because they are joint employers, the user
employer is potentially jointly liable.
Additionally, employers may now be obligated to take part in
collective bargaining.89 Although this may be a benefit for employees and
unions, employers will bear the burden. However, in terms of collective
bargaining, the NLRB made clear that “as a rule, a joint employer will be
required to bargain only with respect to such terms and conditions which
it possesses the authority to control.”90 The NLRA “provides that an
employer has a duty to bargain in good faith with the labor union
representing its workers, must comply with the resulting collective
bargaining agreement, and may be subjected to picketing and strikes by its
employees.”91
Ultimately, the change in the joint employer standard creates a state
of uncertainty for employers because there is no clear definition for what
constitutes “indirect control” and what acts establish sharing or
codetermining essential terms of employment.92 As noted by the dissent,
9 EMP. COORD. LABOR RELATIONS, WESTLAW § 4:27 (Supp. January 2017).
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the decision leaves to the Board the discretion to “give dispositive weight
to an employer’s control over any essential term and condition of
employment in finding a joint employer relationship.”93 Moreover, the
dissent was quick to point out that there is no limiting factor in determining
which relationships fall within the joint employer status.94 With no
guidelines, employers are left to rely on the specific facts outlined in the
2015 Browning-Ferris decision, though they are not of much help because
it was unclear which facts were dispositive in determining the joint
employer status.95 The lack of a clear definition in the new standard leaves
employers to walk on thin ice and take a “hands-off approach” until it’s
clear what actions will trigger the joint employer status.96 Until then, many
employers are going to be caught up in litigation and will have to set the
baseline as guidance for their peers.
Furthermore, it is possible that if the new standard is upheld, other
agencies such as the EEOC and state agencies will adopt the same or
similar definition just as the Department of Labor has, which could lead to
even further expanded liability under various federal and state laws.97 As
an unwelcome result of the unanticipated litigation, employers will put in
the spotlight and face scrutiny requiring them to divulge information
pertaining to their business practices and employee relations that may
cause them functional and financial harm.98

B.

Impact on Unions and Employees

Further, after the NLRB decided the Browning-Ferris case in 2015
there was much debate over what this means for unions and newly deemed
employers. When unions are brought into the mix they are given the upper
hand. Now, when a joint employer relationship is deemed to exist unions
will essentially have the opportunity to negotiate with both employers,
https://www.cozen.com/news-resources/publications/2015/life-after-browning-ferris-wha
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regardless of the extent of their participation in those matters under which
they have authority to control. As a result, both entities will be required to
share in the collective bargaining negotiations and may be obligated to
take a seat at the bargaining table when they previously may not have been
required to do so.99 This places more responsibility on the newly deemed
joint employers and imposes a greater risk of liability. Meanwhile, it
provides a great benefit for employees and gives unions more power than
they have had in the past. The unions now have more opportunity and
reach in their bargaining power and can reach above low level managers
and attempt to negotiate with parent companies directly. This proves to
benefit employees because there is a greater chance that the unions will be
able to secure more lucrative terms under the collective bargaining
agreements when they have the opportunity to bargain with entities higher
up the chain of command.
Over the past year of debate regarding the implications on unions and
collective bargaining, the labor industry received some clarity when the
NLRB decided Miller & Anderson100 in July of 2016. The NLRB
continued its streak of making drastic changes to employment law and
overturned precedent regarding collective bargaining units and returned to
a prior standard established in M.B. Sturgis, Inc.101 (“Sturgis”).
Prior to Miller & Anderson, union units were allowed to be composed
of mixed workers102 but such a unit required the consent of both employers
involved.103 Now, after Miller & Anderson, as long as a joint employer
relationship is found, a union bargaining unit may be formed “between the
actual employees of a business and the employees of a subcontractor
without employer consent.”104 Although this particular issue has fluctuated
over the past years, because of the recent Browning-Ferris (2015)
decision, it has become of heightened importance. Now that the joint
employer standard has been loosened and there is greater potential for a
joint employer relationship to exist, there is also a greater likelihood of
having unions that are composed of a mix of a company’s own employees
as well as those of a joint employer.105 The caveat, however, is that there
must be a shared community of interest in order for a single bargaining
See NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (last updated Aug. 28, 2015,
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unit composed of both solely and jointly employed workers to be
appropriate.106 The appropriateness will be determined by application of
the traditional community of interest factors.107
After both Browning-Ferris (2015) and Miller & Anderson, there is a
much greater possibility of having mixed bargaining units. As such, in
Miller & Anderson the NLRB held that a user employer is only required
to bargain with unions regarding all the terms and conditions of
employment for unit employees it solely employs.108 However, for those
employees who are jointly employed, the employer is only obligated to
bargain over the terms and conditions for which it possesses the authority
to control, again regardless of whether that control is ever actually
exercised.109 With these recent decisions at play, unions have been given
the upper hand and employment law leans towards favoring organized
labor.110
However, in the Browning-Ferris (2015) decision the dissent was
quick to point out that under the NLRA the NLRB is expected to foster the
stability of labor relations and “encourage the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining.”111 From the dissent’s perspective, loosening the
joint employer doctrine does not work to achieve this goal, but rather is a
step backwards and creates an area of unsettled law when the Supreme
Court has stressed the need for certainty.112 The resulting ambiguity of
these decisions leaves employers and unions in fear or of later evaluations
that lead to labor violations or unfair outcomes.113
Moreover, with the possibility of multiple employers at the bargaining
table, the dissent recognizes the immense problem that has now evolved,
which was never contemplated by Congress.114 With multiple employers
bargaining with the unions, there is a chance for greater confusion and
inability to create a collective bargaining agreement that meets the needs
and interests of all parties involved.115 The dissent offers an example of a
Cleaning Company that contracts with three separate Clients A, B, and
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d-the-nlrb-the-miller-anderson-decision.
111
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 37 (Aug. 27, 2015).
112
Id. at 37–38.
113
Id. at 38.
114
Id.
115
Id.
106

2017]

"JOINT EMPLOYER" STANDARD

131

C.116 Under the new joint employer standard, the Cleaning Company is
considered a joint employer with each of the Clients A, B, and C.117 If the
Cleaning Company’s employees choose to unionize, it creates a whole
host of problems not limited to the confidentiality between each client and
the Company, the interests and needs of each client and the Company in
relation to all their employees, and the conflicts that may arise as a result
of inconsistency between employment contracts and the collective
bargaining agreements.118 These are a few among the many potential
issues that arise as a result of the loosened standard. Although as new case
law is established some of these issues are resolved—like the Miller &
Anderson case which resolved the issue of multiple versus single
bargaining units—many new issues arise as a result. Ultimately, it leads to
muddled interpretations on the part of all parties involved to find a way to
mesh these decisions into a coherent and navigable playing field.

C.

Impact on Franchise Businesses

On a similar note, with unions having greater power over bargaining,
franchise businesses are left to scramble because, with a relaxed standard
within which to find joint employer status, franchisors can now be
“declared the employers or joint employers of their franchisees or their
franchisees’ employees.”119 As a result, this has become “a tactic designed
to make large franchisors the economic ‘bargaining unit’ with which
unions may negotiate on behalf of the franchisees’ employees.”120 To
understand the impact Browning-Ferris (2015) will have on the franchise
business industry we must understand how they operate.

1. How Do Franchise Businesses Operate?
The franchise business consists of “a business model that involves one
business owner licensing trademarks and methods to an independent
entrepreneur.”121 Here, the business owner being the franchisor and the
independent entrepreneur being the franchisee. The relationship between
the franchisor and franchisee is governed by a Franchise Agreement that
outlines the terms, conditions, privileges, and other important details of

Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 12 (Aug. 27, 2015).
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the relationship.122 Franchisees typically are responsible for daily tasks and
must operate in accordance with the Franchise Agreement.123 In return for
the benefit of use of the franchisor’s branding and trademarking, the
franchisee must agree to meet the quality and standards required by the
franchisor.124

2. Increased Liability for Franchisors and a Loss of
Independence for Franchisees
Although the NLRB did not explicitly state that the new joint
employer standard requires that franchisors are joint employers with its
franchisees, the dissent established that the decision effectively does just
that—even if the potential joint employer only possess indirect control.125
If the dissent is correct and franchisors are considered to be joint
employers, this will drastically change the franchisor-franchisee
relationship and may lead to the decline of the franchise business model.126
As a result, there will be a vast impact on the economy because there are
nearly nine (9) million Americans who work at franchise businesses.127
Previously, franchisee owners were the only party solely responsible for
those that they hire, were the only party with which unions could bargain,
and were the only party liable for claims of unfair labor practices. Now,
with the possibility of franchisors being considered joint employers over
the franchisee’s employees, the franchisors are considered primary
employers.128 Consequently, the union has the ability to not only bring the
franchisee to the bargaining table but also the franchisor.
This places an increased burden on the franchisor because they now
may be indirectly liable for the actions of the franchisee’s employees. This
shared concept of liability is better understood by considering the doctrine
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of respondeat superior.129 Under this doctrine, “an employer is vicariously
liable for the negligence of an agent or employee acting within the scope
of his or her agency or employment although the principal or employer has
not personally committed a wrong.”130 Under the theory of respondeat
superior, joint employers are now fronted with shared liability and risk
they never anticipated.
Essentially, the essence of owning a business and having the
independence to manage the company as one pleases is undercut by this
new joint employer standard. The shared responsibility limits the
independence of the franchisee to run the company as they wish because
they are no longer able to solely make the decisions regarding their
employees.131 They will likely have to consult with the franchisor, because
now that the franchisee’s actions bear weight on the franchisor’s liability,
franchisors are more likely to be concerned about the franchisee’s actions,
resulting in more corporate control.132 Without a finding of joint employer
status, franchisee owners could run their business as they wanted, of
course in accordance with the Franchise Agreement, but they alone would
be responsible for any repercussions or unfair labor violations. Now,
franchisee owners who may be deemed joint employers with the
franchisors will have to worry about the effect their decisions may have
on the franchisor. Similarly, franchisors who may now be held accountable
for franchisee actions may set strict policies and guidelines on the actions
franchisees may take, essentially undermining the spirit and autonomy of
franchise business operations.
With this decision, the franchisor and the franchisee will be required
to work together rather than just remaining independent business partners.
It is not definite that all franchise businesses will be subject to the joint
employment doctrine as there was no definitive mention of the effect on
franchise business in the Browning-Ferris (2015) decision. However, as
the dissent implies, it is likely that most will because the franchisor most
often sets the standard of quality and service required. Further, under the
new standard this type of control over the employment conditions, whether
actually exercised or not, seems sufficient to establish the franchisor as a
joint employer of the franchisee employees. 133
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Ultimately, in deciding the Browning-Ferris (2015) case the NLRB
stated that the previous joint employer standard was no longer reflective
of our economic circumstances, especially with the recent increase in
contingent employment relationships.134 As a result, franchisors no longer
have the protection they previously enjoyed and now have to be hyper
aware of all the decisions their franchisees are making.135 Likewise,
franchisees have to walk on eggshells to make sure that they are not going
to harm the franchisor while trying to maintain their own autonomy in
making decisions for its independently owned franchise. The outcome is
going to result in overwhelming litigation with plaintiffs working their
way up the chain and chasing after franchisors’ “deep pockets.”136
Moreover, it may lead to the chilling effect of business owners choosing
to forgo the franchise model altogether, or otherwise, it may lead to
franchisors only granting franchisees to businesses that may be more
fiscally reliable and capable of handling the corporate control.137

IV.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the NLRB’s decision to redefine the joint employer
standard, businesses must revisit their agreements and assess the
possibility of joint employer liability. Although there is no single solution,
these relationships and agreements will need to be viewed in light of the
new joint employer standard to avoid any unexpected liability.138 To avoid
such liability and potential responsibility for collective bargaining,
businesses can proactively work to modify existing relationships and look
for guidance from the anticipated NLRB decisions that are expected to
clarify and interpret the new standard. Moving forward, businesses can
make sure when creating new relationships that there is clear distinction
as to which party is going to be the primary employer responsible for
controlling the “essential terms and conditions of employment” so as to
avoid the possibility of a joint employment relationship.
The NLRB’s recent decisions have created a whirlwind for the labor
industry and have everyone on their feet trying to figure out whether they
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may now be considered joint employers and preparing for the changes and
inevitable rush of litigation that will likely ensue as a result. With new
changes on the horizon after the 2016 Presidential elections, the labor
industry will have to work together to interpret the NLRB’s decisions and
put the pieces together to establish the current framework of employment
law until the NLRB provides clear guidance on the matter.

